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Abstract
This paper looks at the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and com-
merce, using the \liquidity" approach to nancial intermediation. Adding a commercial
rm makes it easier for a bank to dispose of assets seized in a loan default. This `internal
market' increases the liquidity of such assets and improves the bank's ability to perform
nancial intermediation. More generally, owning a commercial rm may act either as a
substitute or a complement to commercial lending. In some cases, a bank will voluntar-
ily refrain from making loans, choosing to become a non-bank bank in an unregulated
environment.1. Introduction
The barrier preventing the merger of nonnancial rms with banks is from one per-
spective the last frontier of nancial deregulation, and as such it has received much atten-
tion, particularly in the United States.1 From another perspective, the barrier deserves
attention precisely because it has been breached so often abroad and on several occasions
throughout American history.2 And yet serious economic models of mixing banking and
commerce are rare, perhaps because current theories have little to say about the matter.
In this paper we hope to shed some light on the advantages and disadvantages of
mixing banking with commerce using the \liquidity" approach to nancial intermediation
pioneered in Myers and Rajan (1998), which combines the positive and negative aspects
of liquidity. This results in a concern over a rather dierent set of questions than those
considered by the more information based models of debt and equity, such as Gorton
and Haubrich (1987) or Santos (1998b). We feel that the advantages in considering the
meaning of control rights, the nature of the synergies and the role of liquidity will make
up for the model's (current) inability to consider, for example the questions addressed by
those information-based models and diversication issues.
Most of the literature on banking and commerce has concentrated on banks' equity
positions in borrowing rms. For example, Pozdena (1991), Kim (1992), and John, John
and Saunders (1994) study how a borrowing rm's incentives change when the nancier
uses equity in addition to debt to fund the rm. Boyd, Chang and Smith (1997) and
Santos (1998b) study the implications of equity stakes when funding is provided by a
bank, rather than a nancier, in the presence of moral hazard caused by deposit insurance.
1 For example, see Barth, Brumbaugh and Yago (1997).
2 For a characterization of the regulations on banking and commerce abroad see Barth,
Nolle, and Rice (1997) and for a review of banks' aliation with nonnancial rms through-
out American history see Santos (1998a).
1Santos focuses on the mix of debt and equity as a means to control moral hazard on the
part of borrowers. Boyd et al focus on bank monitoring to control a similar moral hazard
problem. Rajan (1992) studies the impact of a nancier's equity stake on his credibility as
an underwriter. Puri (1996) studies the impact of that stake on the set of rms that the
nancier chooses to underwrite. Finally, Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996) examine the
importance of a nancier's equity stake in a rm that is in nancial distress.
Besides the theoretical literature, there is a growing body of empirical research on
banks' equity investments, most of it using data on Japanese and German banks. Re-
searchers have studied the impact of bank equity stakes on: agency costs, availability and
cost of funds to rms, and on rms' performance both in and out of nancial distress.3
The previous literature misses a key aspect of intermediation identied by Myers and
Rajan, namely, the interplay between the positive and negative aspects of liquidity. Their
model treats banks as a special type of conglomerate; one combining a rm that takes in
liquid deposits with a rm making illiquid loans. We extend the analysis to a broader class
of conglomerates, those combing banks with nonnancial rms. This provides a way of
thinking about what sort of banking-commerce conglomerates might arise and what the
resulting rm might look like. We feel this provides a perspective that has been absent in
previous discussions of banking and commerce.
In the Myers and Rajan model, a highly liquid rm, say one handling cash and gov-
ernment securities, nds it hard to raise money because the possibilities of expropriation
are so high. Making illiquid loans provides a way to bond the managers to the rm, as
walking away now means giving up prots. In the standard Myers and Rajan model such a
bank would not merge with a nonnancial rm, because the resulting conglomerate would
always liquidate the bank's liquid assets and then ask its creditors for concessions through
3 For a detailed review of this literature, see Santos (1998c).
2renegotiation. We show that a sucient condition to reverse this result is the existence of
particular synergies that would be lost if the rms in the conglomerate split up.
While several sources of synergies could be considered, we focus on those related to
liquidity and identify some examples that lead to the formation of banking and commerce
conglomerates. Of particular interest are the synergies arising from the conglomerate
having an internal market for the assets underlying the bank loans. The internal market
increases the liquidity of such assets, and thus makes it easier for the bank to dispose
of them if it seizes them in a loan default. This improves the bank's ability to perform
nancial intermediation. As one example, consider a bank that makes auto loans and also
owns a car-rental company or an auto dealership. This combination would make it easier
for the bank to use or dispose of the collateral from defaulting loans. Other examples of
possible internal markets are also discussed.
We will also consider examples of synergies that have only indirect eects on the
liquidity of the rms in the conglomerate. As before, the merger changes the overall
liquidity of the rm, both by bringing in the less liquid rm and by adding the synergies.
However, by allowing the synergy to take a very general form, we are able to identify cases
where a conglomerate forms even when it loses liquidity and consequently the ability to
extend loans. The merger can even lead the bank to end its lending business and become a
non-bank bank, that is a rm that undertakes only half of the traditional banking function.
If the loss in liquidity is less severe, however, the bank will continue to make loans, only
fewer than before. The nonnancial rm then acts as a substitute for loans. Conversely, if
the resulting conglomerate is more liquid than the bank, it makes more loans than before,
and owning a rm acts as a complement for loans.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
3Myers and Rajan basic model. Section 3 considers the role of liquidity synergies. Section
4 concludes the paper with some nal remarks.
2. Liquidity and Renegotiation: The Basic Model
The model economy in this paper is an extension of that in Myers and Rajan (1998)
and so our description of it here is brief, with an emphasis on results we nd useful later
on. The economy is populated by three types of agents, all of whom are risk neutral
and do not discount the future. There are rms, each of whom owns a positive NPV
investment opportunity that requires an initial investment and returns a cash
ow. Each
rm funds the project with a combination of funds owned by the entrepreneur and a loan
from outside investors, the second group in the model. The borrowing is supported by
promised payments. Investors obtain repayment by threatening to liquidate the rm's
assets. Liquidating the project may not attain its full value, perhaps because of \re
sale" eects, a \lemons" market, bid-ask spreads, bankruptcy and enforcement costs, and
general transactions costs. The third type of agents in the economy are banks, who also
own a project, but of a dierent type.
First consider a generic rm, one that wants to undertake a project that lasts for two
periods and requires an investment equal to I at date 0. The project produces a cash
ow
C1 at date 1 and a cash
ow C2 at date 2. The cash
ows are assumed to be known but
not veriable. The investment creates an asset that has a depreciated value d1 at date 1
and d2 at date 2. These are the values of the asset in its best alternative use. They do
not take into account the liquidation or transformation costs. The project has a positive
NPV, that is, C1 +C2 +d2 > I; and it pays to continue it at date 1, that is, C2 +d2d1;
where  is the portion of the rm's assets that the entrepreneur gets when he liquidates
them.
4The rm funds the investment with funds from the owner E; and by borrowing an
amount B supported by promised payments P1 and P2 at dates 1 and 2. Myers and Rajan
(1998) allow for loan renegotiation at each date following the Hart and Moore (1992)
model. At each date, the borrower makes either the promised payment or he oers a lower
payment. In this case, the lender either accepts the lower payment or turns it down. If the
lender turns the oer down, he can either liquidate the rm (we assume that the lender
cannot seize any cash the borrower generates) or continue the renegotiation. If the lender
continues the renegotiation, he gives up the right to liquidate the rm for the rest of the
period. When the lender agrees to renegotiate, he has a probability a, that is, a measure
of his bargaining power, of making the next and nal oer. With probability (1   a) the
borrower gets the opportunity to make the nal oer. If the nal oer is turned down the
next period's cash 
ow is not produced.
Both borrower and lender contemplate seizing the asset. The borrower may want to
transform the asset before making the promised payments to the lender, that is, either
before date 1 (at date 1/2) or before date 2 (at date 1 1/2). The lender may also consider
liquidating the asset if the borrower does not meet the promised payments at dates 1 and
2. In either case, however, there is a cost of liquidating the asset. Whoever seizes the asset
gets only  percent of its value. Later on we will allow the borrower and the lender to get
dierent percentages; they may have dierent information about the asset or may have
dierent access to the market where the asset is liquidated.
The next step in the exercise is to determine the rm's debt capacity, the maximum
amount it can borrow. We do this solving the model backwards. At date 2, the borrower
either makes the promised payment P2 or oers to make a lower payment. The best the
lender can do is to threaten liquidation, in which case he gets d2: As a result, the lender
5will get MinfP2;d2g; and the borrower will get C2 + d2   MinfP2;d2g:
At date 1 1/2, the borrower decides whether to transform the rm's assets and realize
d2 or to continue in business and generate the cash
ow C2 and the terminal value d2:
The borrower continues if
C2 + d2   MinfP2;d2gd2: (1)
Given (1), the maximum the lender can get at date 2 is
V L2 = MinfC2 + d2   d2;d2g: (2)
At date 1, the borrower may either meet the promised payment P1; or he may ask to
renegotiate the payments agreed to at date 0. The lender may either renegotiate or seize
the assets, so the most the lender can get over the loan's life is
V L1 = MaxfaC2 + V L2;d1g: (3)
In this case, the borrower gets C1 + C2 + d2   V L1; with P1 + P2 = V L1; P2 = V L2:4
To see why this holds, suppose the borrower asks to renegotiate the payments. The
lender either agrees to renegotiate or not. If he does not agree, he can liquidate the project's
asset and guarantee himself d1: If he does agree to renegotiate, then with probability a
he gets to make a take-it-or-leave oer. In this case, he demands the entire cash
ow the
project generates in period 2, C2; and the borrower can do no better than accept. If he
turns down the lender's oer the project will not generate a cash
ow in period 2. With
probability (1   a) the borrower gets to make the take-it-or-leave oer. In this case he
demands the entire second period cash
ow, C2; and for the reason presented above the
4 Myers and Rajan argue that this is an extension of Hart and Moore (1992) lemma 1
and implicitly use E + B + C1   IP1:
6lender can do no better than accept. On average they split the second period cash
ow
according to their relative bargaining power, thus explaining the aC2 term in V L1:
At date 1/2, if V L1=2 is the total amount the borrower expects to pay the lender over
the life of the contract, he will not liquidate the project's asset if
C1 + C2 + d2   V L1=2d1: (4)
Finally, at date 0 the maximum amount the lender is willing to lend, B; has to be
V L1=2B: (5)
The maximum the rm can borrow is given by the solution to the following linear
programming problem
MaxB = P1 + P2
subject to:
P1 + P2C1 + C2 + d2   d1 (6)
P1 + P2Max
(
aC2 + Min(C2 + d2   d2;d2);d1
)
(7)
P2C2 + d2   d2 (8)
P2d2 (9)
Following Myers and Rajan, we assume that C2 is large enough and enough cash is
available to front load debt payments in P1 rather than P2: Under these circumstances,
constraints (8) and (9) are not binding, and constraint (7) becomes
P1 + P2MaxfaC2 + d2;d1g (7a):
In this case, the maximum amount the rm can borrow, B; is determined by the solution
to the system of inequalities
B  C1 + C2 + d2   d1; (6)
7B  MaxfaC2 + d2;d1g; (7a)
In order to simplify the notation, let's dene the following variables:
TC1 + C2 + d2   d1 (10)
GaC2 + d2 (11)
Ld1 (12)
T follows from the transformation constraint at t = 1=2, G follows from the going
concern constraint at t = 1 and L follows from the liquidation constraint at t = 1. Using
these denitions we have that the maximum amount the rm can borrow is given by
B = MinfT;Max(G;L)g (13)
For dierent parameters, each of the three constraints will be binding. Note that if
the transformation condition at date 1/2 is not binding, that is if T is large enough, the
project debt capacity is increasing in the project's liquidity : However, if T binds, then
the project's debt capacity is decreasing in the project's liquidity; such a project is overly
liquid ( >   in gure 1). If G binds, the project's debt capacity depends on cash 
ows
as the lender can't force payment. Such a project is deemed illiquid ( < ^  in gure 1).
If L binds, debt capacity is determined by the liquidation value, and the project is liquid
(^  <  <   in gure 1).
The Debt Capacity of a Bank
Nonnancial rms in this economy are assumed to have an investment project deemed
either illiquid or liquid, that is for them Tf > MaxfGf;Lfg; implying that their debt
8capacity is equal to Bf = MaxfGf;Lfg: This subsection shows that an overly liquid rm
will raise money from investors and loan it to other rms, who would rather borrow from
a bank than directly from investors. That is, an overly liquid rm acts as a bank.
Suppose that the overly liquid rm has an investment project that requires an invest-
ment equal to Ib at date 0, and it produces a cash
ow equal to Cb
1 at date 1 and to Cb
2
at date 2. Suppose also that such project originates an asset worth db
1 at date 1 and db
2 at
date 2. Following the analysis presented in the previous subsection we know that the debt
capacity of that rm is Bb = MinfTb;Max(Gb;Lb)g: Given the assumption that it is an
overly liquid rm, that is Tb < MaxfGb;Lbg; then its debt capacity is Bb = Tb:
We now show that a rm with an overly liquid investment project can become a bank.
We present this analysis in some detail because closely related issues arise in understanding
why a bank and a commercial rm will merge. The analysis proceeds in three steps. The
rst step demonstrates that investors without a project can not become intermediaries;
the cannot raise the money to fund the loan. The second step shows that the bank, which
combines its overly liquid asset with a loan, can raise enough money from investors to fund
the loan Finally, the third step shows that rms can borrow more from a bank than from
investors.
In the previous subsection, we saw that the rm's debt capacity is Bf = MaxfGf;Lfg;
because by assumption its project is either illiquid or liquid. Call this rm, rm F from now
on. Suppose that rm F reaches an agreement with an investor in this economy whereby









Suppose also that the investor has no other assets. Under these conditions, as we are about
to see, the investor will not be able to borrow enough money to support that loan, that is
he is not able to borrow Bf:
9To see that, think of the loan extended by that investor to rm F as an investment
project and dene it as project L: Project L requires an initial investment, Il = Bf: It
produces a cash
ow at date 1, Cl
1 = P
f
1 ; and a cash
ow at date 2, Cl
2 = P
f
2 : How much
money can the owner of project L raise from investors? In order to answer this question we
need to make an assumption about the secondary market for loans because this determines
the liquidation value of the loan. Following Myers and Rajan we assume that there is no
secondary market for loans. Under these circumstances, we have that the transformation











2 = 0 and l = 0 in that condition. dl
2 = 0 because the loan has no value after
all its payments have been made, and l = 0 because there is no secondary market for







2 = 0 and Cl
2 = P
f








2 and l = 1 in that condition. Recall that the liquidation value of a rm
denes how much the creditor gets if he liquidates the rm at date 1. If the creditor to
rm L liquidates that rm at date 1 he gets the rm's assets, the loan to rm F; which
has only the loan's second period payment, P
f
2 ;remaining:
Based on (14)   (16); it is straightforward to see that Tl > Ll > Gl; thus implying
that a rm whose only asset is the payment stream associated with a loan it has extended
is always a liquid rm. (Notice the ambiguous notation. It seems that loan that cannot be
sold should be illiquid, but formally it is liquid.) The debt capacity of such a rm is equal
10to Ll; which is smaller than T1, the amount of money needed to fund the loan to rm F;
since Bf = Tl: In sum, a rm with no assets other than a loan to a liquid or an illiquid
rm can not raise enough money from investors to fund that loan.
But what about a rm with an overly liquid investment project? What is the debt
capacity of that rm when it combines its asset with the loan to rm F? Call the rm
resulting from the combination of an overly liquid investment project with a loan to rm
F; a bank, and identify the variables related to it with a superscript bl. The bank's
transformation value is TblTb + Tl, its going concern value is GblGb + Gl, and its
liquidation value is LblLb + Ll: Following (13); the debt capacity of the bank is
Bbl = MinfTbl;Max(Gbl;Lbl)g: (17)
It is easy to see that Bbl can be equal to Tbl meaning that the bank can raise enough money
to fund its overly liquid project as before, that is Tb; and to make a loan equal to Tl to
rm F: Myers and Rajan's Proposition 1 shows that there always exists a range of illiquid
and liquid projects that will increase the incremental debt capacity of an overly liquid
rm. The bank will not selectively transform its overly liquid asset with the expectation
of obtaining concessions from its creditors through renegotiation because it knows that its
creditors are always better o seizing immediately the bank's portfolio of loans rather than
renegotiating their claims. This follows from Myers and Rajan corollary 2.
Following Myers and Rajan we next argue that rm F can (weakly) borrow more
from the bank than from investors. The reason is that the bank has more bargaining
power than investors over the rm's cash





now on, where necessary, we will use the subscripts B and I to distinguish the variables
that are bank and investor dependent). That dierence in bargaining power may result
from a better bargaining expertise of the bank or from free riding problems among the
11rm's creditors in case it borrows from several investors. Such a dierence implies that the










Recall that only the going concern value of the rm, Gf; depends on the bargaining power
of its creditors.
The increased bargaining power also means that the bank can raise enough funds to
nance the larger loan of size B
f
B to rm F: Note, however, that there is a limit to the
size of the bank's loan portfolio. As the bank makes more and more identical loans, it
eventually ceases to be overly liquid, at which point its advantage disappears.
The Myers and Rajan model explains why a bank would rather lend than merge with a
rm. Loans provide a way around the problem of selective liquidation and allow an overly
liquid asset (of the bank) to combine with a less liquid asset (the loans) increasing the debt
capacity of both. The banking and commerce question presents the opposite problem. We
want to study when it is advantageous to form a conglomerate made of a bank, an overly
liquid rm in the terminology of this paper, and a nonnancial rm, a liquid or an illiquid
rm. This is the subject of the remainder of the paper.
3. Banking and Commerce
Most historians agree that banks arose from commercial merchant ventures (Shull,
1983), and of the various reasons for mergers between banking and commerce (increased
capital, diversication, economies of scale) the most interesting are the economies of scope,
or synergies. One of the best descriptions of what this entails is by Chandler (1977, p.6)
who argues that conglomerates are more likely to arise \When administrative coordination
permitted greater productivity, lower costs, and higher prots than coordination by market
mechanisms." Williamson (1985) gives examples of such control benets, citing benets
12from internal audits and the ability to employ very specic assets. Telling (1984) argues
that putting nancial centers in Sears' retail stores brought in customers who would not
traditionally use nancial services and infused Sears' tradition of customer service into the
nancial rms. John Jay Knox, Comptroller of the Currency from 1872 until 1884, referred
to such \corporate culture" ideas when he re
ected on the importance of private banks
in the U.S. \With the development of the interior counties, men of other businesses, such
as land agents, general store-keepers, etc., transacted more or less of a banking business
in connection with their regular business...their knowledge of banking has been gained by
hard experience, and as a class they are careful, shrewd, and substantial businessmen."
(Knox, 1900 pp.777-778).
A more specic set of synergies was described by Alexander Todd, who started out
delivering letters to miners and later sold out to Wells Fargo in 1853, when he explained
the transformation from express company to bank (quoted in Loomis, 1968, p. 6).
It was not long before the miners came to us to get us to take care of their money
for them. It was a very common thing for me to start out from Stockton with two
horses loaded down with gold dust. The miners had no opportunity for taking
care of their dust, and we were obliged to have safes at our dierent oces, and
our express business soon merged into a banking business. We charged them for
taking care of their dust 1/2 percent per month, and they gave us the privilege
of using it also.
In order to have a viable model of banking and commerce, we must be able to answer
several questions. Will the bank choose to own the nonnancial rm rather than make a
loan to it? Will the bank selectively transform its core overly liquid asset when combined
with a nonnancial rm? What eect will owning a nonnancial rm have on the equilib-
rium number of loans undertaken by a bank? Is there a trade-o or are there down stream
synergies as well?
We will consider two somewhat dierent sources of synergies that may be explored
through the aliation of banks with nonnancial rms. First, we consider a specic
13example of a liquidity synergy, one that directly alters the bank's liquidation ability of
certain assets{owning a nonnancial rm allows the bank to form an internal market for
certain assets, thus making it easier to dispose of them when they are seized in a loan
default. Second, we consider what would happen if there were a synergy that aects the
cash 
ows and liquidation values of the separate projects. The rst case emphasizes how
pure liquidity considerations will lead to the merging of banking and commerce. The
second case emphasizes how certain synergies will change the structure of the bank.
3.1 Liquidity Synergies
A necessary condition for the formation of banking and commerce conglomerates
is the existence of synergies associated with the presence of a nonnancial rm in the
conglomerate. In the example of the previous section, if the bank were to bring a liquid
or illiquid nonnancial rm in-house after it had extended the maximum number of loans,
its added debt capacity would never exceed (and might be lower) the debt capacity of that
nonnancial rm on its own (this is similar to Myers and Rajan's Proposition 1 a). Mixing
banking and commerce is not advantageous in the absence of synergies or externalities.
Suppose, however, that by owning a rm in a given sector the bank learns more
information about that sector. The bank can use that information if it needs to liquidate
the assets of a rm in the same sector to which it has extended a loan. Alternatively,
the synergy could result not from new information but from the bank's ability to use the
assets it seized in its own rm, rather then having to sell them. Upstream synergies are
yet another possible example. Suppose a bank owns a rm that produces a product used
as an input by other rms. If the bank extends loans to these rms, then on default it
will get the asset produced by its in-house rm. Under these circumstances the bank can
sell that asset to its in-house rm and avoid, at least partially, the costs of nding a third
14party buyer.
The aspect common to all these examples is that a conglomerate made of a bank and
a nonnancial rm creates an internal market for the assets underlying the loans extended
by the bank. That market increases the liquidity of the assets, leading to an increase in
the debt capacity of the bank in the conglomerate. In terms our model's parameters, this
is an increase in f; the fraction of the assets underlying the loan that the bank recovers
in case of their liquidation. The more opaque, dicult to evaluate, or industry specic are
those assets the larger is the opportunity cost of not forming the conglomerate.
Historically such an internal market seems to have played some role in the mixing of
banking and commerce. Before the 1970 amendments closed the one-bank holding company
loophole, banks engaged in a variety of non-nancial activities. The House Committee on
Banking and Currency (1969) found 397 banks engaged in non-nancial businesses, 165
in real estate activities such as building, operating, and leasing, 41 in various types of
farming, 4 in public warehousing, all activities that quite likely can create an internal
market. banks
Note, however, that because conglomerates can not commit to not selectively trans-
form its assets, the existence of synergies is not a sucient condition for the formation
of banking and commerce conglomerates. Even though there is no secondary market for
loans the conglomerate could transform the very liquid assets of the bank and renegotiate
the assets of the nonnancial rm. As we will see, there is a minimum size for the bank's
portfolio of loans in order for a banking and commerce conglomerate to be sustainable,
that is to avert selective liquidation. One nice point of this approach is that the synergies
resulting from combining a bank with a nonnancial rm are of a liquidity nature, the
same critical element that distinguishes banks from other rms in the model.
15To show the implications of the liquidity synergy, suppose that there are many rms
in the economy identical to rm F of the previous section, that is with a liquid or illiquid
investment project. Suppose also that there is a bank in the economy, that is a rm with an
overly liquid project like that of rm B in the previous section. Under these circumstances,
there is a maximum number of loans of a size B
f
B that the bank can extend. Ignoring integer
constraints, that number, is given by (18)
Tb + nB
f
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At period 1, in case they seize a loan, bank's creditors are entitled only to the loan's
second period payment, P
f
2 ; because at that time the rm has already made the rst period
payment, P
f
1 ; to the bank.5
If bank's creditors are not as able as the bank in liquidating the assets of a rm




B; and this would be taken into account in the
period 1 renegotiation between the bank and its creditors and it will reduce the value of
Ll




I and drop the subscripts. This implies that
the conglomerate's creditors will also benet from the liquidity synergy, though this will
happen only if the creditors get control of the entire conglomerate.
Suppose now that the bank aliates with a nonnancial rm. We identify the variables
associated with that rm with a superscript c. Because it is a liquid or an illiquid rm, we
5 We could generalize this result and introduce an additional cost of liquidating P
f
2 , but
that would complicate matters without providing much illumination.
16have Tc > MaxfGc;Lcg: This implies that rm C's debt capacity is Bc
B = MaxfGc;Lcg;
when it borrows from a bank. As discussed previously, if there were no synergies it would
not be advantageous to form such a conglomerate. Suppose, however, that by aliating
with this rm, the bank is able to explore a synergy like that described above.
Proposition 1: If by aliating with a particular rm the bank can liquidate the
assets underlying the loans it extends to other rms more easily then when it has to sell
them in the market, that is, it leads to an increase in f; then:
i) The liquidity synergy may lead to an increase in the debt capacity of the bank, thus
making the formation of the banking and commerce conglomerate advantageous.
ii) Selective transformation will not be optimal if the bank's portfolio of loans is
suciently large.
Proof: see appendix.
To understand why that synergy helps the bank increase its debt capacity, remember
that the reason loans work well when combined with the bank's overly liquid asset is
because they are illiquid from the point of view of the bank (absent a secondary market,
the bank gets nothing if it attempts to transform its loans) but they are valuable when
seized by the bank's creditors, thus giving them bargaining power. However, for a loan
of a given size, that bargaining power varies with the distribution over time of the loan's
promised payments. At the extreme, if all the payments the loan promises to make are
concentrated in period 1, this reduces the bank's incentive to transform its assets at period
1/2, but it gives little bargaining power to bank creditors because by the time they expect
to receive the rst payment from the bank (period 1) the bank has already pocketed the
loan's payment. This reduces creditors' willingness to lend to the bank, reducing its debt
capacity.
17The bank can solve that problem if it can structure the loan so that most of the
proceeds arrive in period 2. This, however, is credible only if the bank has bargaining
power over the assets of that rm at period 2, that is, if it can get a large fraction of
the rm's asset at that point in time. That bargaining power is given by the liquidity of
that rm's assets at period 2, which is determined by the nature of the assets and by the
bank's ability to sell them. In terms of the parameters of the model, that bargaining power
determines the value of f:
To put it a dierent way, increasing f; that is, increasing the liquidity of the assets
of a rm, increases the bargaining power of the bank's creditors, which increases their
willingness to lend to the bank. The bank can do that by creating an \internal market"
for that underlying asset, thus avoiding the costs of selling it in the marketplace.
A numerical example
The liquidity synergy discussed above comes out clearly in a numerical example. We
base our example on the extended example given in Myers and Rajan (1998). The pa-




2 = 4; and
ab
I = 0:5: To simplify we assume that b = 1; (recall that the bank and its creditors get
the same fraction of the bank's assets if either one of them liquidates these assets). Using
(10)   (12) we nd that Tb = 1;Gb = 4:5; and Lb = 5: Since the bank is an overly liquid
rm, its debt capacity is, according to (13), Bb
I = 1:









2 = 1; and a
f
B = 0:5: We assume f = 0:3 . Using (10)   (12) we nd that
Tf = 2:4;Gf = 0:8; and Lf = 0:6: These nonnancial rms are illiquid rms. Their debt
capacity is, according to (13), B
f
B = 0:8: When the bank extends a loan B
f
B = 0:8 to one
of these rms it charges P
f
1 = 0:5 in period 1 and P
f
2 = 0:3 in period 2.






I = 0:5: l
B = 0 because there is no secondary market for the loan. l
I = 1 because
there is no cost for the bank's creditors when they threat to cease the loan in the period
1 renegotiation. Using (14)   (16) we have Tl = 0:8;Gl = 0:15; and Ll = 0:3: Based on
these values and (17); we nd that the maximum number of loans of size B
f
B = 0:8 that
the bank can extend is n = 8: The bank's debt capacity is 7.4.
Suppose now that the bank brings in-house a nonnancial rm. The parameters of this
rm are equal to those of the nonnancial rms presented above. We use a superscript






B = 0:5; and c
B = c
C = 0:3: As we saw above
if this rm were to borrow from a bank it would be able to borrow 0:8 units because
Tc = 2:4;Gc = 0:8; and Lc = 0:6: In the absence of synergies and leaving aside the
problems of selective liquidation for a moment, we have that the transformation value of
the conglomerate is Tblc = 3:4 + 0:8n; its going concern is Gblc = 5:3 + 0:15n; and its
liquidation value is Lblc = 5:6 + 0:3n: Using these denitions and (18); we nd that the
maximum number of loans of size B
f
B = 0:8 that the bank in the conglomerate can extend
is n = 4:4; in which case the conglomerate's debt capacity is 6.92. Forming the banking
and commerce conglomerate is not advantageous under these circumstances.
Let's assume that bringing the nonnancial rm in-house leads to a liquidity synergy
of the form discussed above, that is, it makes it easier to liquidate the assets underlying the
loans the bank extends to rms F: This leads to a increase in f: Lets dene ~ f the new
value for that variable resulting from the synergy. The new transformation, going concern
and liquidation values for the conglomerate, assuming that the bank does not change the
19size of the loan it extends to each rm F, are
~ Tblc = Tb + Tc + nTl = 3:4 + 0:8n
~ Gblc = Gb + Gc + al
In ~ P
f
2 = 5:3 + 0:5n~ f
~ Lblc = Lb + Lc + n ~ P
f
2 = 5:6 + n~ f
Given that ~ Lblc > ~ Gblc; then the bank in the conglomerate will be able to fund the
same 8 original loans if ~ f0:525: Suppose that ~ f = 0:525: In this case, bringing the
nonnancial rm in-house gives the conglomerate the opportunity to raise enough money
to fund the same 8 loans to rms F as before and to fund the bank's core project and
rm's C investment project with the same amounts as before and still have some funds
left. The debt capacity of the conglomerate when it funds 8 loans is 9.8, which exceeds
the sum of the debt capacities of the bank with 8 loans, 7.4, and that of the rm C when
it raised money on its own, 0.8.
Now we show that selective transformation will not occur. Following (A:5) we have
4 < 5:1: Therefore, selective transformation will not occur at period 11
2: Now move back
to period 1
2. If the conglomerate chooses not to selectively liquidate, assuming that it
makes all the loans it can, that is, until it stops being an overly liquid rm, then we have
n = 8; in which case the conglomerate receives bdb
1 + cdc
1 = 5:6: If the conglomerate
chooses instead to selectively liquidate the bank's core project then it gets only bdb
1 = 0:6;
because the conglomerate's creditors will not renegotiate their claims. This follows from
(A:6) because we have 6 > Maxf2;3g: As a result, the conglomerate will not selectively
transform its assets at period 1
2 either.
We discussed above some general examples that could lead to the type of synergy
considered here. The association of a bank and a nonnancial rm creates an internal
20market for the assets underlying the loans extended by the bank. Wells Fargo, for example,
with its expertise in transporting and assaying gold would nd it easy to dispose of gold
dust seized from a defaulting miner.
Mixing banking with commerce is advantageous in the model presented here because
it liquies the assets underlying the loans extended by the bank without increasing the
liquidity of these loans. Given the important allocative role of internal capital markets in
many conglomerates (c.f. Lamont, 1997, Houston, James and Marcus, 1997) more general
combinations remain a possibility.
3.2 Indirect Liquidity Eects
Looking at what happens when the synergy alters cash 
ows and underlying asset
values requires a slightly dierent approach. We assume that making a loan to the project
will not result in the synergy. Only if the bank owns the project and brings it \in house"
will the synergy eects occur.6 This assumption is in line with others often made in the
literature. For example, Boyd, Chang and Smith (1997) assume that equity investment
allows investors to share in the project's perquisite consumption, whereas debt investment
does not. Secondly, we assume that this eect decreases as more projects are added to the
bank's core project. In the model we specialize this even more and assume only the rst
added nonnancial rm has synergistic eects. Ideally, of course, a model would specify
why these eects occur, but we feel that this is secondary to understanding the liquidity
aspects.
Since the model is already stylized we will consider a synergy of a specialized type.
Combining the nonnancial rm with the bank will increase the output of the invest-
6 Clearly, in some cases debt nancing can also bring control, and presumably the
benets would accrue in such cases. While perhaps important in the past, the equitable
subordination doctrine makes it less relevant today.
21ment projects of both entities in a particular way. The second period cash 
ow of the
bank's project increases to Cb
2 + sb
2. In addition, the rst period liquidation value of the
nonnancial rm's project increases to dc
1 + sc
1:
That synergy has two important eects. By taking the project in house, the bank
obtains synergies that would not occur if it simply made a loan to the project. The bank
also has an incentive to not selectively liquidate the project, because it would lose the
synergies. In the basic Myers and Rajan model, a bank does not aliate with a nonnancial
rm because the bank would transform its overly liquid project and renegotiate the debt
payments.
Now consider what happens if the bank brings the nonnancial rm in house and
gains the synergies. For now we simply assume that the bank will not selectively liquidate
either project. Then we can simply apply equations (10)-(12). The transformation value


















2: The liquidation value
of it is Lbc = bdb
1 + c(dc
1 + sc







Why is direct investment better than a loan? Tautologically, because it is more
protable to bring the nonnancial rm in-house rather than to make a loan to the rm.













2   Bbl; (20)
where Pc
1 and Pc
2 are the payments that the bank receives from the nonnancial rm
C in return to the loan it extended to that rm, and Bbl
I is the amount that the bank
borrows from the investors in the economy. In the case where the conglomerate remains



















2: Recall that we continue to assume that there is no secondary






which holds as long as the synergy sc
1 is not too negative.7
Selective liquidation places further constraints on the values of sb
1 and sb
2. The con-
glomerate has a real temptation to to transform its overly liquid core project and renegoti-
ate the payments on the other project. Losing the synergy payos may make the selective
transformation unprotable, however.
What can we say about the conglomerates that might form? We characterize the most
salient features in proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
i) For some parameter values, conglomerates form.
ii) Conglomerates need not be overly liquid rms.
iii) Adding a nonnancial rm to a bank may increase or decrease the debt capacity.
Proof: see appendix.
The rst part of the proposition indicates that some synergy values are large enough
to stop the conglomerate from liquidating the core banking project and renegotiating the
debt on the less liquid commercial project. In some cases, synergies are valuable enough
for rms in this economy to want them.
The second part of the proposition predicts the existence of \non-bank banks," in-
stitutions that retain only part of their banking activities. In that case, institutions that
7 Readers familiar with Myers and Rajan may note the added complexity that arises
when synergies mean that protability is not longer identical with debt capacity.
23accept deposits only. Nonnancial rms combine with deposit taking rms, but they do
not have any advantage to extend loans. This in fact became fairly common when the
market discovered the one-bank loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. The
model interprets these non-bank banks as more than simply the product of regulatory ar-
bitrage. It instead suggests that they are a viable form that would arise in an unregulated
market.
The last part of the proposition indicates that the conglomerate will often remain
a bank and make loans. This is really a question about whether the combined entity
remains overly liquid. In the Myers and Rajan paper, the overly liquid rm becomes a
bank and adds illiquid loans to its portfolio until it is no longer overly liquid. Adding a
nonnancial rm might, but need not, soak up the excess liquidity of the core bank project.
In particular, funding a nonnancial rm in house need not substitute for loans to other
commercial projects. In some environments, though, such a trade-o will exist.
The numerical example continued
As we saw before, the debt capacity of the bank is Bb = 1: The debt capacity of the
nonnancial rm when it borrows from the bank is Bc
B = 0:8: In this case the bank asks
the rm to pay Pc
2 = 0:3 in period 2 and Pc
1 = 0:5 in period 1. When the bank combines
its core project with a loan to that nonnancial rm, it remains, an it overly liquid rm,
and its debt capacity is Bbl = 1:8:
Suppose now that the bank chooses to bring the nonnancial rm in-house and realize
the synergies. Using (10) (12) we nd that the transformation value of the conglomerate
becomes Tbc = 3:4 + sb
2   0:3sc
1; the going concern value of it becomes Gbc = 5:3 + 0:5Sb
2;
and the liquidation value of it becomes Lbc = 5:6 + 0:3sc
1: Assuming that sc
1 = 6 and
sb
2 = 3; then we have Tbc = 4:6; Gbc = 6:8; and Lbc = 7:4: As a result, the debt capacity
24of the conglomerate is 4:6: Given that the conglomerate remains an overly liquid rm, and
sc
1 = 6 > 0; then (20a) guarantees that it is optimal to form the conglomerate.
The nal thing we need to address is the problem of selective liquidation. Consider
the case of selectively transforming the core banking project. At period 11
2, selective
transformation does not occur because (A:8) is met, sb
2 = 3   5: Now move back to
period 1
2. Note that because the nonnancial rm is an illiquid rm, then (A:10) applies.
Selective transformation does not occur because sc
1 = 65:33:
We can go further and establish that this combined entity will also make at least one
loan equal to 1 unit to a rm F; supported by payments P
f
1 = 0:7 and P
f
2 = 0:3; and thus
can be considered bank. Again using (10)   (12); we nd that the transformation value,
the going concern value and the liquidation value for that entity are 5.6, 6.95, and 7.7,
respectively. Therefore its debt capacity is 5.6, an improvement over the combined rm
without a loan. Firm F; if funded separately, would have a debt capacity of 0.8; by making
a loan, the bank can raise $1 and lend $1 to that rm. In fact, the bank can make a total
of four loans. After that, the added debt capacity is less than the projects can get on their
own, as constraint (7a) begins to bind instead of (6).
Other possibilities exist, however. For example, if we set sc
1 = Sb
2 = 10; then the
conglomerate will not be overly liquid as Tbc = 10:4; Gbc = 10:3; and Lbc
I = 8:6:
6. Conclusions
In seeking to understand banking and commerce, we have purposely ignored many
important concerns, such as extension of the safety net, incentives to self-deal, and other
adverse incentives. We have instead concentrated on the underlying economic motives that
would induce banks and nonnancial rms to merge. This has provided insights in several
areas.
25First, our model has explored the possible synergies that allow viable mergers to take
place. One advantage of the model is that it concentrates attention on motives for merger
that arise purely for reasons of liquidity. By creating an internal market, merging with
a nonnancial rm increases the bank's eciency in disposing of assets backing defaulted
loans. Bankruptcy codes may then play a large role in determining which mergers are
viable.
A concentration on liquidity also yields some insights on other sorts of synergies. These
have an indirect impact on a bank's liquidity and this will impact both the viability of the
merger and the structure of the resulting bank. Banks do not have an incentive to form
conglomerates with just any rm that promises higher prots; the ability to separately
liquidate the rms in fact imposes fairly strict requirements. The nature of the synergies
also suggest that they are project specic, and consequently, though some industries may
become closely associated with banking, there will also be surprises where specic rms in
unlikely industries will also associate with banks.
Finally, the model demonstrates that owning a nonnancial rm can act either as
a substitute or a complement to commercial loans. The substitution can be so large as
to stop the conglomerate from lending at all. It becomes a non-bank bank. In actual
experience, we will most likely see dierent banks pursuing each of these strategies.
26Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
i) Following (18); reintroduced here as (A:1); we know the maximum number of loans,
n; that the overly liquid rm B can extend to liquid or illiquid rms like rm F:
Tb + nB
f
B = MaxfGb + nGl;Lb + nLlg (A:1)
Suppose that rm B aliates with a liquid or illiquid rm like rm C; and that this leads
to an increase in fraction of the assets underlying the loans extended by the bank to rms
F recovered in case of liquidation. That is, it leads to an increase in 
f
B: Suppose also
that the bank does not change the size of the loans it extends to rms F as a result of
the synergy, that is, it keeps lending B
f
B to each one of them, but it changes the time




2 : Then, we know, based
on (13); that the debt capacity of that conglomerate, Bblc
I ; is
Bblc = MinfTblc;Max( ~ Gblc; ~ Lblc)g; (A:2)
where
TblcTb + Tc + nB
f
B;





~ LblcLb + Lc + n~ fd
f
2:
Because Tc > MaxfGc;Lcg; then for n = n and ~ f = f we have
Tblc > Max( ~ Gblc; ~ Lblc): (A:3)
As a result, the conglomerate will be able to continue funding n loans of size B
f
b and if
~ f solves (A:4):




2;Lb + Lc + n~ fd
f
2g: (A:4)
Note that in this case, the conglomerate is able to raise more money than the sum of what
the bank and the nonnancial rm were able to raise independently.
ii) Now we take up the problem of selective liquidation. If the conglomerate transforms
its most liquid assets, those of the bank, at period 11
2; it receives bdb
2: Recall that in
this case, the conglomerate's creditors will not accept to renegotiate their claims. They
are better o seizing the loans and liquidating the assets of the nonnancial rm in the
conglomerate. If the conglomerate chooses instead not to selectively transform its assets,




2 + n ~ P
f
2   Pblc
2 ; where Pblc
2 is the second


















27Now move back to period 1







2 +n( ~ P
f
1 + ~ P
f
2 ) Bblc; where Bblc is the total amount
that the conglomerate borrows from investors. Assuming that the conglomerate makes all
the loans it can, that is, until it stops being an overly liquid rm, then we have Bblc = ~ Tblc:
In this case the conglomerate gets bdb
1 + cdc
1:
If the conglomerate chooses instead to selectively liquidate the bank's core project then
it gets, in case its creditors do not renegotiate, bdb
1: If the conglomerate's creditors' do
not renegotiate, that is, if they seize the conglomerate's assets when the bank transforms





B is the bank's portfolio of loans. If,
instead, the conglomerate's creditors accept to renegotiate at period 1, then they get




B > MaxfGc + nGl;Lc + nLlg: (A:6)






I: Otherwise, (A:6) imposes a lower boundary on the size of the
bank's portfolio of loans for renegotitation not to occur at period 1.
When the conglomerate's creditors are not expected to renegotiate, the conglomerate





Proof of proposition 2.
i) For the existence of conglomerates we must show that the bank does not selectively
transform its core project. Start at period 11
2. If the bank in the conglomerate does not



















This implies a restriction on possible synergy values. Notice that sc
1 value, which has
already been bargained over and distributed, does not matter for renegotiation at this
period. Therefore we must have
sb
2  (b + b   1)db
2   Cb
2: (A:8)
Now move back to period 1









I : Continuing to assume that the





If instead it transforms the asset at period 1











































2; if it selectively transforms its assets.












ii) The conglomerate need not be overly liquid. Suppose the conglomerate is overly
liquid, so that Tc binds. Now look at the eect of synergies on Bc, and use  to denote
the dierence between the constraint with synergies and the constraint without synergies.










1 constant. That means the value of (A.11) increase, as does
the value of (A.12), while (A.13) remains constant. Now if Lc > Gc increasing sb
2 will
eventually give us tc > Lc and we are done, as the conglomerate is no longer overly liquid.
If af < 1 the eventually we will get Lc > Gc for large enough sb
2: Finally, if neither of the
above two cases holds, decrease sc
1 until Gc binds. This may cause a problem as the prot







2   Bc (A:14)





2)   renegotiated debt (A:15)
The value of the renegotiated debt depends on the project, being cd
p





1 for an illiquid project. If this happens, increase sb
2 until (A.13)>(A.14).
iii) Analytically, this becomes a question about the ranges of  , the point at which




















Since both the numerator and denominator increase with the synergy, the exact results
depend on the actual values taken on by the variables. It is signicant to note, however,
that the synergy may increase or decrease the level of  , and thus the number of loans
that the bank may make.
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